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WHAT EVIL HAVE WE WROUGHT: CLASS
ACTION, MASS TORTS, AND SETTLEMENT
Manuel L. Real*
Mass tort litigation is accurately characterized as one of the most
complex forms of federal civil litigation. It is not unusual for such
lawsuits to involve multiple claimants, varied damage awards, and
complex evidentiary concerns. However, as Winston Churchill once
said, "Out of intense complexities, intense simplicities emerge."1
During my three decades on the bench, it has become clear to me
that there are some very basic and fundamental tenets that judges can
follow in their approaches to mass tort litigation. Two specific rules
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-Rule 1 and Rule 23provide judges with remarkably straightforward guidance in answering the complex question of how to resolve mass tort litigation.
Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure enunciates the
basic goals for judges in the management of civil litigation, stating
that the rules which govern procedure in the United States District
Courts "shall be construed and administered to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. 2 Rule 23
provides the tools and procedural framework to realize these goals in
the context of mass torts.3
The origins of these rules and their relevance to the modern day
judge in addressing settlement and resolution of mass tort litigation is
discussed below. This Essay has three basic components. Part I
* United States District Judge, Central District of California.
1. Stewart I. Edelstein, Bombast v. Cogent, LrrIG., Spring 1992, at 45, 46.
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
3. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23. For instance, subsection (a) articulates the prerequisites to a class action.
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of
all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Subsection (b) further states the additional requirements
necessary to maintain a class action. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
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provides several historical observations on the development of
mechanisms to deal with mass tort litigation and discusses some early
mass tort cases. Part II explores the relevance of Rule 23 and Rule 1
to the trial judge in the mass tort context. Part III contains my reflections on the settlement process and includes some recommendations based upon my own experiences. Finally, the Essay concludes
with a series of questions to judges and practitioners about the future
direction of mass tort litigation.
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

In the last twenty years, federal litigation has gone through a
metamorphosis of procedural developments to cope with the increasing number of cases collectively known as "mass torts."
Beginning in 1961, federal judges confronted 25,623 separate antitrust claims in 1912 civil actions filed in 35 district courts throughout
the country in what was known as the Electrical Equipment Antitrust
Cases.4 Recognizing the problems inherent in such litigation, Congress enacted legislation in 1968 which created two vehicles to provide for the efficient processing of massive class actions and mass
torts. The first vehicle set out the rules for Multidistrict Litigation
under 28 U.S.C. § 1407.' This Act allowed for cases filed throughout
the federal system to be concentrated into one court where a single
district judge would hear and supervise all pretrial matters involving
a single common claim for damages in tort litigation. 6 The second
vehicle created the Federal Judicial Center to train federal judges to
better handle what was becoming a flood of federal litigation
The Federal Judicial Center, with the impetus of its first director,
retired Associate Supreme Court Justice, the Honorable Tom C.
Clark, and a Board of Editors, created the Manual for Complex and
MultidistrictLitigation that was designed to "[s]timulate the devising
of procedures appropriate to new problems as they arise. It is intended to be a living document into which desirable techniques
proved by experience will be incorporated in the future."' In keeping
4. See In re Equity Funding Corp. of America See. Litig., 375 F. Supp. 1378,
1389 (J.P.M.L. 1974) (Becker, J., concurring). For a more complete discussion of
this litigation which involved antitrust claims against electrical equipment manufacturers, see Phil C. Neal & Perry Goldberg, The ElectricalEquipmentAntitrust
Cases: Novel JudicialAdministration,50 A.B.A. J. 621 (1964).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1994).
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a)-(b).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 620 (1994).
8. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LIGATION xii-xiii (1st ed. 1969).
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with the philosophy of its origin that "[t]here are no inherently protracted cases, only cases which are unnecessarily protracted by inefficient procedures and management,"9 the Manual has seen two revisions. ° With each revision of the Manual comes the changing
realization that "[a] functional definition of complex litigation recognizes that the need for.., judicial management with the participation of counsel... does not simply arise from complexity, but is its
defining characteristic: The greater the need for management, the
more 'complex' is the litigation."" Whether it be pretrial, trial or
settlement, today's massive class action and mass tort litigation
clearly require management by a judge willing to forsake popularity
to effect "the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action" provided by Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
The full force of the congressional reforms, however, was not
fully realized until the last two decades. Before then, innovative
judges and trial attorneys had to figure out how to resolve mass tort
cases expeditiously. The pioneers in this regard were the judges and
practitioners in the late 1960s and early 1970s who took the mandate
of Rule 1-the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action-seriously and applied it in the context of mass tort litigation.
One example of this innovation was the effort of federal courts to determine the common question of liability in air crash litigation.
Judge Peirson M. Hall was one of the first federal judges to deal
with the common liability question effectively in this context. In response to the objection by defendants to the consolidation of 337
wrongful death claims for pretrial and trial in In re ParisAir Crash of
March 3, 1974, 3 Judge Hall observed:

The most important rule of all is the last sentence of
F.R.Civ.P. 1, which provides that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 'shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action.' It is this command that gives all the other rules life and meaning and
9. Id. at ii.
10. The MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (2d ed. 1985) was edited by the
Honorable Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Chief Judge, Northern District of Alabama. The
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (3d ed. 1995) was edited by then Director
of the Federal Judicial Center, the Honorable William W Schwarzer, United
States District Judge, Northern District of California.
11. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 10.1 (3d ed. 1995) [hereinafter
MANUAL].

12. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
13. 69 F.R.D. 310 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
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timbre in the realist world of the trial court. It makes the
rules useful tools for the trial of actual litigation instead of
abstractions to be pontificated over in seminars by learned
scholars of the law who have seen little or nothing of real
litigation in the trial courts, where approximately 90 percent
of all civil litigation is handled and terminated.' 4
Judge Hall was a realist and a superb trial judge. I had the honor
of working with him in the Paris Air Crash cases. Under his guidance, we resolved all 337 claims.'5 For all of the claims, we consolidated the issue of liability. 6 With liability out of the way, only four or
five trials on damages were necessary and the remainder of the cases
settled. In retrospect, I believe it would have been easier and more
efficient if we had used Rule 23 class action procedures rather than
consolidating the cases under Rule 42(a). 7 Today, appellate courts
appear to be pushing trial judges in their search for justice and efficient handling of mass torts to forsake Rule 23 in the handling and
settlement of mass tort litigation. 8 Perhaps appellate courts should
back-off and re-read Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 19
During the 1970s, courts used class actions to determine the
common question of liability in air crash litigation, among other torts.
For instance, early personal injury and antitrust cases involving numerous plaintiffs became class action mass torts rather routinely because they involved a small class of hundreds of individuals." Where
toxic substances or other products produced thousands of plaintiffs,
however, the defense bar was opposed to using Rule 23 as a procedural framework for litigation. Critics cited the language of the Advisory Committee of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that "[a]

14. Id. at 318.
15. See id. at 323.
16. See id.

17. Rule 42(a) states in relevant part: "When actions involving a common

question of law or fact are pending before the court.... it may order all the actions consolidated." FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a).
18. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997),
Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), and General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir.
1995).
19. For examples of early approaches to mass tort litigation in which the
court certified a class action under Rule 23(b)(3), see Bentowski v. Marfuerza
Compania Maritima S. A., 70 F.R.D. 401 (E.D. Pa. 1976) and In re FederalSkywalk Cases,95 F.R.D. 483 (W.D. Miss. 1982).
20. See, e.g., In re Master Key Antitrust Litig., 528 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1975);
Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
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'mass accident' resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily
not appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood [of] significant questions,
not only of damages but of liability and defenses
2
[to] liability." '
Unfortunately, the defense bar relied on the language in the advisory notes in a somewhat piecemeal fashion. In stressing the language of the advisory notes, which warns against the potential harm
to individual claimants in class actions, critics overlooked relevant
language. The very same notes encouraged judges, with the help of
innovative lawyers, to use class action procedures in appropriate circumstances: "[T]he court with the aid of the parties ought to assess
the relative advantages of alternative procedures for handling the total controversy ... [and decide whether or not a class action] is
'superior' to the others in the particular circumstances. '
Federal judges found that the class action procedure was a
"superior" method of handling mass tort litigation and thus began
relying on Rule 23 in cases involving bendectin,' Agent Orange,24 asbestos,2 gypsum,' human rights,2 breast implantss and DES,29 to
name but a few. In many of these cases, judges have applied Rule 23
liberally to reflect the due process requirements of Hansberry v.
Lee,3 and Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.;3' as was
similarly done with Equity Rule 38 (Representative of Class), the
predecessor to Rule 23. A common thread in all of these cases was
the court's effort to obviate the problem of inconsistent results due to
multiple jurisdictions, the threat of multiple punitive damage awards
for a single tortious act, and the inability of recovery for persons with
smaller claims. Thus, the class action in mass torts is a more effective
method of addressing these concerns-concerns that would otherwise
21.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note.

22. Id23. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); In re

"Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 102 F.R.D. 239 (S.D. Ohio 1984).

24. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216 (2d Cir.

1987).

25. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997);
Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), Jenkins v. Raymark
Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 408, 473 (5th Cir. 1986).

26. See, e.g., In re Gypsum Antitrust Cases, 565 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1977).
27. See, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996).
28. See, e.g., In re Dow Coming Corp., 211 B.R 545 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1997); In re Breast Implant Cases, 942 F. Supp. 958 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1996).
29. See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs., 83 F.R.D. 382 (D. Mass. 1979).
30. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).

31. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).

442

LOYOLA OFLOSANGELES LAWREVIEW

[Vol.31:437

require more cumbersome and difficult consolidation if handled
through Rule 42.
II. RELEVANCE OF RULE 1 AND RULE 23 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE

As mentioned before, Rule 1 and Rule 23 constitute a basic
framework for judges handling mass tort litigation. Rule 1 lays out
the overarching goals of ensuring justice and efficiency in civil litigation. Rule 23 provides the tools and procedural framework to realize
these goals in the context of mass tort litigation.
Many have debated and disagreed about the use of Rule 23's
class action procedure for handling mass torts.32 In my opinion, a
class action is the paradigm of mass tort resolution. As I read Rule
23, it provides the trial judge with most, if not all, of the tools to
handle the multitude of problems that could arise in the most complicated of mass torts. I believe we have come to a point in massive civil
litigation where we may now consider Rule 23 action treatment because of its versatility in handling discrete issues in mass torts, such as
diversity of citizenship or federal question jurisdiction cases through
the vehicle of 28 U.S.C. § 1407 Multidistrict Litigation. Rule 23 is an
essential tool for judges. Two sections of the Rule form the bedrock
of its value to courts. First, Rule 23(b) allows judges to aggregate
claims and to handle common questions of fact and law among claimants. It is an invaluable mechanism for avoiding multiple trials and
inconsistent outcomes among plaintiffs.
Second, Rule 23(e)
"requires approval of the court.., for the dismissal or compromise of
any class action."33 This rule is the foundation for much of the judge's
power to persuade and facilitate fairness in settlement.
Those opposed to the use of Rule 23 in mass tort litigation maintain that all plaintiffs in personal injury litigation are entitled to their
own lawyer and jury verdict. As the Third Circuit has pointed out:
Settlement classes, which constitute ad hoc adjustments to
the carefully designed class action framework constructed
by Rule 23, lack the regulatory mechanisms that ordinarily
check this improper behavior: "There is in fact little or no
individual client consultation and no judicial oversight of a
32- See, e.g., Robert T. Krebs, Castano v. American Tobacco Co.: Class
Treatment of Mass Torts is Going up in Smoke 24 N. KY. L. REv. 673 (1997);
Richard A. Nagareda, In the Aftermath of the Mass Tort Class Action, 85 GEO.
L.J. 295 (1996); William W Schwarzer, StructuringMulticlaim Litigation: Should
Rule 23 Be Revised?, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1250 (1996).
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) advisory committee's note.
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hidden process of wheeling and dealing to maximize overall
fees for hundreds and thousands of massed
recovery
34 and
cases."'
The opponents neglect to mention, however, that the majority of
individual claims would not be economically viable if brought independently. In the absence of the class action mechanism, tortfeasors
may avoid liability. Furthermore, matters of liability are more often
than not common issues in mass torts.36 An example of what class
action mass tort litigation can accomplish is found in In re Estate of
Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litigation37 a large Multidistrict
Litigation ("MDL") that came before me in the late 1980s. The case
involved 23 individual plaintiffs and a class of 9539 human rights victims. The torts occurred at the hands of Ferdinand E. Marcos when
he was president of the Philippines from 1972 to 1986. The Alien
Tort Claims Act served as the basis of jurisdiction. We tried the case
in Hawaii because Ferdinand E. Marcos lived and was served there
after his overthrow as president of the Philippines in February 1986.38
The Ninth Circuit certified and approved the class in Hilao v.
Estate of Ferdinand Marcos as "[a]ll current civilian citizens of the
Republic of the Philippines, their heirs and beneficiaries, who between 1972 and 1986 were tortured, summarily executed or disappeared while in the custody of military or paramilitary groups., 39 The
litigation resulted in a finding of liability: exemplary damages of $1.2
billion and compensatory-damages of $766 million.
Given the vast number of plaintiffs and the complexities involved in determining compensatory and exemplary damages, this
litigation could have been unwieldy. Instead, the Marcos court was
able to employ Rule 23 in a way that greatly facilitated disposition of
the case. As a class action, the court aggregated the claims, addressed common issues of fact and law, and trifurcated the litigation
into three discrete trials for liability, compensatory, and exemplary
damages.4 Looking back, I believe that this process was efficient, accorded due process to the parties, and resulted in a fair assessment of
damages for the plaintiffs.
34. In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig.,

55 F.3d 768, 788 (3d Cir. 1995).

35. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709,732-33 (4th Cir. 1989).
36. See id.at 732.
37. 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994).

38. See id. at 1469.

39. 103 F.3d 767,774 (9th Cir. 1996).

40. See id at 782.

LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

444

[Vol.31:437

More recently, as evidenced in the General Motors fuel tank litigation, what has concerned appellate courts in Rule 23 disposition of
cases is that:
the possibility of pre-certification negotiation and settlement may facilitate the filing of strike suits. Since settlement classes can involve a settlement achieved either before
or after the filing of class claims, recognition of the settlement class device allows plaintiffs to file as class actions
cases that counsel never intended to have41 certified, but instead only to settle the claims individually.
Attempting to meet the criticism hurled at settlement classes,
the Judicial Conference's Standing Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure is considering an amendment to Rule 23(b) which
covers certification and settlement in a single proceeding.42 Applied
to settlement classes, proposed Rule 23(b) would provide:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be
maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact
common to the members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include:
(A) the practical ability of individual class members to pursue their claims without class certification;
,(B) class members' interests in maintaining or defending separate actions;
(C) the extent nature, and maturity of any related
litigation involving class members;

41. In re GeneralMotors, 55 F.3d at 789.
42. See RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F.
LITIGATION:

SHERMAN, COMPLEX
CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 21-22

(2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 1997).
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(D) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum;
(E) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action, and
(F) whether the probable relief to individual class
members justifies the costs and burdens of class litigation; or
(4) the parties to a settlement request certification under
subdivision (b)(3) for purposes of settlement, even though
the requirements of subdivision (b) (3) might not be met for
purposes of trial.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to
be Maintained; Notice; Judgment; Actions conducted partially as Class Actions.
(1) When practicable after the commencement of an
action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by
order whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this
subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or
amended before the decision on the merits.

(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not
be dismissed or compromised without hearing and the approval of the court, and after notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise has been given to all members of the
class in such manner as the court directs. 43
(f) Appeals. A court of appeals may in its discretion
permit an appealfrom an order of a districtcourt grantingor
denying class action certificationunder this rule if application
is made to it withing ten days after entry of the order.

43. Id.
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An appeal does not stay proceedings in the district court unless the districtjudge or the court of appealsso orders.
The italicized material is the language that the Standing Committee added to 23(b) to address those matters that appellate courts
have criticized in a trial court's consideration of mass tort class action
settlements. Although only subsection (f) has been approved by the
Judicial Conference and passed onto Congress for its appeal, whatever other provisions will ultimately be adopted is in the hands of the
Civil Rules Committee.
Although I find little need for such an amendment to Rule 23,
recent cases have given trial judges pause to stop and think about
their settlement approval practices, particularly in those cases involving the settlement of class action mass torts.4
Justice Breyer, who concurred and dissented in Amchem Products v. Windsor,4s gives solace to trial judges-assuming he can convince other justices-in stating that we are not alone in the search to
provide fair settlements for small claimants who would have no way
to recover for injuries resulting from a mass tort other than the class
action litigation procedures provided in Rule 23.46 Amchem makes it
clear that pending any amendment to Rule 23(b), certain procedures
and findings are required of trial judges.47 Moreover, the proposed
rule must withstand a tortuous process through the Standing Committee, Supreme Court, and Congress before achieving final acceptance.4 Sanguinity in this process is at best a fond hope or perhaps an
evanescent dream.
III. SETrLEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The paradigm mass tort or complex case contemplated by the
Manual on Complex Litigation leaves little role for the judge to play
in the settlement process other than to "serve as a catalyst for settlement discussions, create an atmosphere conducive to compromise,
and make suggestions helpful to the litigants., 49 Setting a firm trial
44. See In re General Motors, 55 F.3d at 768; Georgine v. Amchem Prods.,

Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), aff'd, Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct.
2231 (1997).

45.
46.
47.
48.

117 S.Ct. 2231, 2252 (1997).
See id. at 2256-58.
See id. at 2248.
See id

49.

MANUAL,

supranote 11, § 23.11.
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date is another technique judges can implement to promote settlement.Y Indeed, it is generally the most effective means to motivate
parties to settle.5'
The Central District of California also encourages settlement.
Local Rule 23 Mandatory Settlement Procedures requires parties to
opt for one of the four suggested settlement procedures provided under Rule 23.5.52 Those discussions must be undertaken at least fortyfive days before the final pretrial unless exempted by the trial judge.5
Requiring settlement discussions was intended to remove attorneys'
reluctance to suggest or engage in the settlement process since a
willingness to talk about
compromise would no longer represent
4
case.
a
in
weaknesses
The parties and the judge should rarely approach settlement discussions without the required presence of the person-party, counsel,
insurer-with the full authority to settle the litigation. Often the settlement process can be expedited, by consent of the parties, with the
judge removed from the direct process of negotiations and the appointment of a special master pursuant to Rule 53 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure'5 or referral to a magistrate judge who has
the time to devote to the prolonged negotiations usually required in
mass tort or class action settlements.56 Bifurcating issues in mass tort
cases can settle issues of liability that often stand in the way of settlement discussions and place the judge in the position of nurturing
the settlement process.7
The use of a special master places the settlement process in the
most neutral situation and provides for candid discussion of the
strengths and weaknesses of a party's position without the strictures
and formalities that inevitably attend discussions with the trial
judge." The requirement that the parties compensate the special
master has rarely created any problem. However, while the use of a
50. See id. § 23.13.

51. See id.
52. See United States District Court, Central District of California, Local
Rules of Practice 23.2, 23.5 (1997).
53. See id. 23.2, 23.3.
54. See MANUAL, supra note 11, § 23.11.
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 53. Rule 53(a) states in relevant part: "The court in
which any action is pending may appoint a special master therein." Id.
56. See MANUAL, supra note 11, § 20.14.
57. See id. § 23.13.
58. See id.
59. Nonetheless, the appointment of a special master may substantially increase the cost of litigation, thereby offsetting any potential savings. Thus, par-
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special master can provide for innovative and mutually beneficial arrangements, this may, because of the need to try or otherwise dispose
of the case if settlement negotiations fail, compromise the judge's
neutrality, or at least the appearance of neutrality, in the case. As
required by Rule 23(e), the trial judge must be the final arbiter of the
fairness of the settlement to absent persons whose interest the court
has a duty to protect. 60
Commentators note that Rule 23 imposes very liberal guidelines
or requirements upon judges in their consideration of settlements in
class action mass tort cases. 61 It may be true that there are no specifics guidelines or requirements in Rule 23(e) other than: "A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of
the court."62 Nonetheless, Rule 23(e)'s requirement of court approval is a broad admonition to judges to use all the available tools of
Rule 23 to fairly judge any proposed settlement. The fact that judges
have not utilized all those tools does not invalidate the principle that
class action procedures can and should be used in processing mass
tort litigation through trial or settlement.
The Supreme Court's statement in Amchem that "[flederal
courts, in any case, lack authority to substitute for Rule 23's certification criteria a standard never adopted-that if a settlement is 'fair,'
then certification is proper,"63 is much like the Advisory Committee
note on the use of Rule 23 in mass torts." Experience in the trenches
tells us that fairness of the settlement to all parties-plaintiffs and defendants-should be the first consideration when approving settlements. Without fairness, no criteria can be applied to the Rule 23(e)
requirement of court approval of a settlement.
The determination of fairness may now require that a judge
know the details of how a settlement has been reached." The judge
must look to familiarity with the subject matter of the settlement or
may require consultation with independent experts- available under
ties should keep in mind whether they can afford the cost of a special master. See
id. § 21.42.
60. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
61. See, e.g., Richard A. Chesley & Kathleen W. Kolodgy, Mass Exposure
Torts: An Efficient Solution to a Complex Problem, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 467, 485
(1985); Steven L. Schultz, In re Joint Eastern and Southern DistrictAsbestos Litigation: Bankrupt and Backlogged-A Proposalfor the Use of Federal Common
Law in Mass Tort Class Actions, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 553,613 (1992).
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
63. Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2249.
64. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee's note.
65. See MANUAL, supranote 11 § 23.14.
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Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence-who have knowledge of
the business or industry that gave rise to the injury or damages a
plaintiff now seeks from a defendant."
, Relief the settlement proposes to provide to plaintiffs-present or
absent-as well as the ability of a defendant or insurer to respond, must
be scrutinized. A settlement without the ability to fulfill the obligations
undertaken either in terms of money, action or inaction, cannot be approved by a judge since it can be viewed as a money tree for counsel
from which clients get only the ground nuts.67
Amchem also appears to require a determination and explanation that the claims of the beneficiaries of a settlement are justiciable in federal courts as required by Article III cases or controversy
considerations." What is left for explanation is whether Amchem
and the expansive view of Georgine have at last fallen into the camp
of the opponents to class actions in general and mass tort class actions in particular. Judge Lowell A. Reed, Jr., working with Judge
Charles Weiner of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in the gigantic asbestos litigation, had extensive hearings and made findings
on the need and the fairness of the proposed mass tort class action
settlement considered in Georgine. All his efforts were nullified by
the Georgine and Amchem opinions. What is left is the wounded
and dead.
IV. CONCLUSION
Whether it be pretrial, trial, or settlement, today's massive
class action and mass tort litigation clearly require management by
a judge willing to forsake popularity to effect the mandate of Rule 1
by fully utilizing the procedural framework of Rule 23. In terms of
an action plan for judges to implement this procedural framework,
a distillation of the Third Circuit's opinions in recent mass tort litigation is instructive. Trial judges should actively oversee the settlement process and should try to accomplish the following:
- Ensure absent class members are properly represented,
notified, and accorded due process;
- Prevent collusion between counsel for the class and defendant during the settlement process;
- Evaluate the effects of res judicata and collateral estop66. See id
67. See id. §30.41.
68. See Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2244.
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pel on the proposed settlement and record objections to
settlement on the record;
- Assess fairness and reasonableness of the settlement to all
class members, and make findings as to the value to each
individual plaintiff.
Finally, in the Talmudic tradition which can be so helpful in the
analysis of modem issues of law, I leave several further questions for
review and reflection on the issue of settlement in mass tort litigation.
1. Are we on the brink of making justice the slave of procedure?
2. Assuming subject matter jurisdiction and a duty of the court
to find the settlement fair and equitable, are the reasons for the desire to settle a claim by the parties of any concern to the courts?
3. Assuming subject matter jurisdiction-case or controversyis justiciability of a settlement really a separate concern?
4. Should the court be very concerned about the self-interested
motives of the parties in settling given the fact that plaintiffs obtain
some recovery and defendants gain the protection of res judicata?
5. Is it time for creativity-i.e., federal common law?

